Abstract:
As in 1620–21 the reformed confederacy (Hungary–Moravia–Silesia–Lower and Higher Austria) planned by Bethlen had failed, he had to find new ways to establish the statehood of the Transylvanian Principality.
In his policy, he used the forced Turkish/Ottoman alliance as a solid basis threatening the Hungarian King (from the Habsburg dinasty) several times with the power of the Ottoman Empire while he compelled the King with armed forces to observe the “Hungarian constitution”.
From 1624 on, the “Báthory-model” (i.e. the Polish Kingdom) as an alternative received more and more emphasis in his foreign policy. He, however, unreasoningly overrated the social influence of the Polish and Lithuanian Protestants and judged it to be sufficient for him to obtain the Turkish/Ottoman permission.
Bethlen underlined this idea at the Porte by suggesting that his brother-in-law, Gustav Adolf, the Swedish King would support him to obtain the crown. Exactly this positive reaction for Bethlen, the alliance of the European Protestants was the reason which prompted the Porte to be cautious so as not to risk the status quo of the Danube-basin.
